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In wireless communications, transmissions are
susceptible to be intercepted by eavesdroppers. As
security implies links reliability, the purpose of this
project is to secure communications at the physical
layer to prevent the home user from conﬁguring his
wireless connection security application by himself.
The idea is to apply a beam-hopping pattern at
an access point, which will allow to choose the
direction in which to send a signal and combine it
with a power control to guarantee the target user
with receiving the same amount of power during a
whole communication.
This project mainly includes two aspects.
 Evaluate the performance of the beam hop-
ping pattern. In this part, we try to dete-
riorate the signal received by the eavesdrop-
per by orienting the beam towards the target
user.
 Investigate the eﬃciency of a power con-
trol processing called Automatic Gain Con-
trol (AGC) and combine it with the previ-
ous technique to perturbate the eavesdropper
signal even more and make it very diﬃcult
for him to decode a signal sent by the access
point to the target user.
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Security is "the precautions taken to ensure against theft, espionage, or
other danger, or the state of being free from danger, damage, or worry con-
dition" [2]. In the general sense, security is a concept similar to safety. The
nuance between the two is an added emphasis on being protected from dan-
gers that originate from outside. Individuals or actions that encroach upon
the condition of protection are responsible for the breach of security. In
our domain, we could deﬁne security as the condition that results from es-
tablishement and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of
inviolability from hostile acts of inﬂuences [3].
As far as communications security is concerned, [4] deﬁnes this term by the
measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information de-
rived from telecommunications and ensure the authenticity of such telecom-
munications. Communications security includes several steps:
 cryptosecurity to ensure message conﬁdentiality and authenticity.
 emission security to deny unauthorized persons from intercepting and
analysing information.
 physical security to safeguard classiﬁed equipments, materials and doc-
uments from access or observation by unauthorized persons.
 traﬃc-ﬂow security to conceal the presence and properties of valid mes-
sages on a network.
 transmission security to protect transmissions from interception and
exploitation by means such as frequency hopping or spectrum analysis.
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Because protecting conﬁdential information is a business requirement and
also an ethical and legal requirement, in this report we aim at protecting
information from interception by eavesdroppers. First of all we need to
deﬁne several terms which are parts of security in order to choose which one
to investigate. Basically, the information security can be divided into three
main goals known as the Communication Integrity Availability (CIA) triad:
 Conﬁdentiality of information which means that this information
must only be accessed, used, copied or disclosed by persons who have
been authorized to do so and only when there is a genuine need to do
so. It is required for maintaining the privacy of the people information
held by an organization.
 Integrity of information which implies that data cannot be created,
modiﬁed or deleted without authorization. For example when a virus
is set up on a computer, there is a loss of integrity because this virus
might erase data or ﬁles on this computer.
 Availability of information which requires that when information is
needed, it is available and that the computing systems and the security
controls of it function correctly.
To respect those three basics, we could investigate the access control part
of a transmission. Of course, only people who are authorized should be able
to access protected information. To do so, it is mandatory to explore the
foundation on which access control mechanisms are built, which means iden-
tiﬁcation and authentication.
 Identiﬁcation is "the act of determining the properties of something,
usually by research or calculation" [5].
 Authentication is "the act of validating, ﬁnding or testing the truth
of something" [6].
 Once a person, a program or a device has been identiﬁed and authen-
ticated, it is necessary to determine which resources they are allowed
to access and which actions they are allowed to perform. This process
is known as authorization.
As an important point in protection, security controls should be improve-
able and upheld. Besides, a log journal should be held as to keep track of
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failed and granted attempts of authentication. The most eﬀective way to
protect information is to transform it into a form unusable by anyone other
than an authorized user. Encryption allows it. The concept of encryp-
tion is to allow only an authorized user to decrypt information thanks to
a cryptographic key he is the only one to possess. Cryptography protects
information while this is in transit and in storage. For instance, wireless
communications can be encrypted using Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocols.
1.1.2 OSI model
Working on security aspects requires some knowledge about communications
and computer network protocol design. This network protocol design is of-
ten represented by a layered, abstract description and referred to as the
OSI model. OSI is an International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
standard for worldwide communications. This standard inﬂuences the de-
sign of computer networking protocols in several layers for the Information
Technology (IT) Industry [7]. The OSI model is illustrated in Figure 1.1
where the nature of the data controlled at a level is shown. In Table 1.1.2,
we can see a sum up of the layers with their functions and some common
security protocols used at each level of the stack. The aim of the OSI model
is to divide networks into several components so that it becomes easier to
secure them, level by level, and reduces their vulnerabilities.
Figure 1.1: OSI Model
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Table 1.1: Security protocols used in the diﬀerent layers
Application layer
This layer provides application services for the application processes. It does
not perform services to the end user but to user-deﬁned application processes.
To maintain security in this layer, anti-virus softwares and ﬁrewall systems
have been developed to respectively prevent the user from external attacks
and to control the access of applications to the network. Finally, applications
can also implement their own security controls (assuming that communica-
tions will be subject to attack) by requiring the use of strong authentication
and encryption to validate and protect data as it travels across the network.
Presentation layer
The presentation layer is susceptible to use diﬀerent syntaxes and semantics.
In fact, the presentation layer allow the data to pass from the application
layer into the network. To maintain the security, input should be checked




Dialogues and connections between computers are controlled by the session
layer, which means established, managed and terminated. In the OSI model,
this session is responsible for graceful close of sessions, and also for session
checkpointing and recovery [14]. Accounts have speciﬁc expirations for cre-
dentials and authorization. Finally, a limited failed session attempts can be
implemented to avoid brute-force attacks on access credentials.
Transport layer
The transfer of data between end users is made transparent and reliable to
the upper layers through the transport layer. The reliability of a link is
kept thanks to diﬀerent processes such as ﬂow control, segmentation and
de-segmentation, and error control [15]. To maintain security, a protocol
named Transport Layer Security (TLS) has been developed to prevent eaves-
dropping, tampering and message forgery. TLS involves three basic phases:
1. Peer negotiation for algorithm support
2. Key exchange and authentication
3. Symmetric cipher encryption and message authentication
Network layer
The Network layer provides functional and procedural means of transferring
variable length data sequences from a source to a destination via one or
more networks while maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS) requested by
the Transport layer. The most famous protocol of this layer is the Internet
Protocol (IP) one which manages the connectionless transfer of data one
hop at a time, from end system to destination end system through several
routers. Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a suite of protocols for securing
IP communications by authenticating and/or encrypting each IP packet in
a data stream. IPsec also includes protocols for cryptographic key establish-
ment.
Data link layer
The data link layer is responsible for the procedures of data transfer between
network entities and for detection and correction of errors occuring in the
physical layer. Some protocols have been developed on this layer to maintain
security, such as WEP or WPA protocols. But these protocols seem not to be
strong enough and also diﬃcult to manage for the domestic user. That's why
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we need to investigate a way to secure the physical layer in a transparent and
inherent way for the user as a complement security to the security features
obtained in higher layers.
Physical layer
This layer sets all the physical and electrical speciﬁcations for devices and
particularly the relationship between a device and a physical medium, e.g.
layouts of pins, voltages, cable speciﬁcations, hubs, repeaters, network adapters,
and more. The physical layer guarantees the establishment and termination
of a connection to a communication medium, and also its participation in the
process whereby the communications resources are eﬀectively shared among
multiple users. This layer is in charge of the modulation or the conversion
between the digital representation of data in users equipment and the corre-
sponding signals transmitted over a communication channel. These signals
operate over the physical cabling, e.g. copper, optical ﬁber, or over a radio
link.
Each layer of the OSI model owns weaknesses and vulnerabilities, but as this
thesis refers only to physical layer security, we will only mention about this
layer known vulnerabilities and several means to control them. The physical
layer can present weaknesses, as listed in [16], such as loss of power, loss
of environment control, physical theft of data and hardware, physical dam-
age or destruction of data and hardware, unauthorized changes to the func-
tional environment (data connections, removable media, adding/removing
resources), disconnection of physical data links, undetectable interception of
data. To control those aforementioned vulnerabilities, it is possible to use
some solutions like locked perimeters and enclosures, electronic lock mech-
anisms for logging and detailed authorization, video and audio surveillance,
Personal Identiﬁcation Number (PIN) and password secured locks, biometric
authentication systems, data storage cryptography, or even electromagnetic
shielding.
1.2 Target user and eavesdropper: diﬀerentiation
The goal of our project is to prevent an eventual eavesdropper from intercept-
ing the information intended to the target user and we focus on the physical
layer security aspect. There are several ways to distinguish the target user




 or frequency domain.
Figure 1.2: Diﬀerence between user and eavesdropper [1]
Figure 1.2 from [1] represents the positions of the access point, the
target user and the eavesdropper. This ﬁgure diﬀerenciates the user from
the eavesdropper using two dimensions, i.e. time τ , or frequency f , and
space X . The target user and the eavesdropper are spatially separated, so
we will be able to diﬀerenciate them spatially due to their diﬀerent spatial
locations by nature. Typically, the Access Point (AP) needs to know the
users' locations to diﬀerenciate them and this is possible by applying in an
open loop system. The channel impulse response can be:
 either instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI).
 or averaged CSI.
Given this assumption, the AP is now able to know unique frequency and
time proﬁles for each of the users.
We will use a function called impulse response as the response of our sys-
tem. The Fourier transform of the impulse response is known as the transfer
function. It is usually easier to analyze systems using transfer functions (in
frequency domain) as opposed to impulse responses (in time domain), be-
cause the calculation are much more easier. Actually we do not have to use a
convolution but only a product to calculate the received signal. The Fourier
transform of a system's output may be determined by the multiplication
of the transfer function with the input function in the complex plane, also
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known as the frequency domain. The Fourier transform can be represented
through this form:
h(τ,Xt, xe)
F→ H(f, xt, xe) (1.1)
where h is the impulse response of the system, H is the transfer function, τ
is the propagation delay, xt and xr are the space locations of the transmitter
and the receiver. The
F→ represents the Fourier transform. The underlined
symbols denote vectors. We can easily distinguish with the transfer function
the diﬀerences between the eavesdropper and the target user.
Then, we have to distinguish two types of system, the closed loop and
the open loop one.
 A closed loop system is a system where the transmitter needs to have
a feedback. Let us give an example. The AP will send the information
to the mobile phone using a downlink connection and will wait for the
feedback of the mobile phone through uplink connection.
 An open loop system is a system where the transmitter does not need
a feedback from a receiver to proceed. An open loop system is eﬃ-
cient and has low complexity when coupled with average coding. The
assumption is that the Uplink is known by the AP and that the Down-
link is considered as the same as the Uplink because the movement of
the target users and the eavesdropper is quite small in space domain
(small area). So the system is quite stable between uplink and down-
link because the average response is the same. Scrambling coding is
an option of average technique.
1.3 SISO, SIMO, MISO and MIMO system
SISO systems in control engineering usually refer to a simple control system
with one input and one output. In radio, it is the use of only one antenna
both at the transmitter and receiver side. It is opposed to MISO, SIMO
and MIMO systems, which use multiple antennas either at transmitter side,
or receiver side or both. It is obvious that MISO, SIMO andMIMO sys-
tems present some advantages. They are more robust against a possible
eavesdropper because the information will be sent using several antennas,
so they improve the transmission performances in terms of diversity, array,
multiplexing and interference reduction gains. They are also more robust
regarding to the equipment. Indeed, if one antenna is not working, the in-
formation can still be sent using the other antennas. The ﬁgure 1.3 shows
the four diﬀerent kinds of system. Figure 1.4 shows us a SISO system. On
this ﬁgure, h denotes the CSI from the AP to the target user. x is the signal
sent by the the AP.
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Figure 1.3: SISO, MISO, SIMO andMIMO systems
Figure 1.4: Conventional SISO system
1.4 Problem Deﬁnition
1.4.1 Motivation
In 2007 a survey [17] sponsored by RSA Security showed that in London
Business Center, companies' networks had grown with a 62% factor but that
36% of those networks were vulnerable. This proportion of possibly weak
systems becomes bigger if we focus on domestic networks, considering that
home users do not spend the same amount of money as companies to secure
their network. The home users do not hire specialized technicians to set
up their network and be sure that the security level is high enough. Home
users usually conﬁgure their equipment by themselves and the result is often
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not suﬃcient to guarantee the conﬁdentiality and/or the integrity of their
information. Setting up a WEP key to control access to a network is not
within the range of everybody and even when it is, this security protocol can
be broken using a mere free software that you can ﬁnd on the web. A WPA
encryption protocol has been developed to improve the WEP. However it
involves longer sequences of encryption and WEP is nowadays the default
protocol of encryption so end users have to activate WPA on their own.
Complete beginners in the realm of networks spend a huge amount of time
and money on their hotline trying to get through this problem.
To avoid this kind of situations to the common end users who do not have
a clue about the security aspects involved during the conﬁguration of their
networks, we choose to investigate the security aspect at a lower level so
that this process becomes totally transparent to them. In this thesis, we
concentrate on smart processes applied in the physical layer to ensure safe
and protected data transmissions.
1.4.2 Previous works on security at the physical layer level
In [18], the authors investigate a way to secure communications via wave-
form coding in MIMO systems. To improve the security of the link, they pro-
pose to use multiple antenna systems and to code information. In a student
project [1], the main idea is to apply a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
scheme in a MIMO system between the access-point and the target user, and
to avoid the interception and decoding of the signal by eavesdroppers, which
means security of the data information in the physical layer in this case. The
authors evaluated the performance of the SVD scheme in a MIMO narrow-
band system, investigated the security of the system regarding the eaves-
dropper interceptions and ﬁnally proposed a trade-oﬀ between capacity of
the target user and the electronic message. In [19], the authors investigate
a way to enhance the security of wireless sensor network, using two ran-
domized array transmission schemes to secure wireless sensor network at the
physical layer. They assume that the unauthorized user have a good received
quality of the signal and is aware about all the transmission protocols. [20]
proposes an interesting method to secure the transmission at the physical
layer as well. The idea is to induce a deterministic noise-like interference
to the undesired receivers. The results are shown through simulations by
measuring the upper bound of the information-theoretical secrecy and error
performances.
Many works were already driven on physical layer wireless security, but there
is still some interesting point to investigate. [18] , [1], [19], [20], [21], [22]
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1.4.3 What can be further investigated in the physical layer
security?
While reading several works on the subject, we pointed out three main as-
pects of the physical layer wireless security which could be interesting to
develop.
Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting can be implemented in several ways. It can:
 consist of using the medium to carry overlay information on top of the
baseline information. This overlay information can be either a part of
the transmitted data in order to increase the rate performance or an
encryption key to improve the link security [18]. This can be referred
to as "stream ﬁngerprinting".
 consider modulation of bits with several modulations techniques such
as two Binary Phase Shift Key (BPSK) modulations instead of one
Quadrature Phase Shift Key (QPSK) to decode the transmitted sig-
nal. The bit rate is decreased but the security is increased because an
eavesdropper does not know which kind of modulation has been used.
This can be referred to as "`modulation ﬁngerprinting".
It would be interesting to investigate this latter part to see if suﬃcient secu-
rity level can be achieved and if eavesdropping can be prevented. Basically,
we could focus on the bit level to check if data may be corrupted as previous
work [18] on the former part showed some satisfying results at block and
symbol levels.
Imperfect CSI
The diﬃculty considering imperfect CSI is to diﬀerenciate the eavesdropper
from the target user. It is possible that in this case, the eavesdropper has a
better signal than the target user and some smart technique should help to
solve this problem. It is very interesting to investigate this work because it
is very close to the reality. Moreover, all previous works on physical security
had always taken into account a perfect CSI.
Beam Hopping
Using average CSI would allow us to spend less time on measuring instan-
taneous CSI. Basically, the smart point would be to apply a beam hopping
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pattern to the system so that the AP would 'jump' from a beam to another
to reach the target user, trying to avoid interception of his signal by an
eavesdropper.
1.4.4 Our problem choice
Previous works on security at physical layer [1], [18]- [22] introduced
closed loop systems with multiple input antennas at the transmitter side as
to be able to estimate instantaneous channel impulse responses. As a secu-
rity aspect, we want to investigate a more simple model requiring an open
loop system which allows us to use average CSI by assuming that the CSI in
dowlink is the same as the uplink ones. To do that, we will test the eﬃciency
of a beam-hopping pattern applied to the AP who would jump from a beam
to another to reach a given target user represented by several clusters in the
far-ﬁeld of the AP's indoor service area. It might create a very turbulent
state at a possible eavesdropper.
Since the AP has no feedback from any user because of open loop as-
sumption, it can only deal with directional CSI. Thanks to this directional
consideration, a SISO system can be applied, which means that both AP and
users are equipped with a single port antenna. This ensures low hardware
complexity at both sides, assuming that the receiver is a mobile station such
as a handportable device. The AP is able to scan the environment thanks
to a beam pattern A(θ) it will sweep along the service area in order to get
directional CSI and compute the power response E(θ) of the environment.
Several clusters are randomly located in the service area and each cluster
is constituted of 20 scatterers, so the AP could change the direction of the
beam with respect to the directional response of the environment. A target
user and a possible eavesdropper are distinguished in this open loop SISO
system by their clusters' spatial location, but we don't know anything about
the eavesdropper as he is only listening and not broadcasting.
Figure 1.5 represents our scenario considering only the AP and the target
user represented by his diﬀerent clusters. One beam A(θ) is created by the
AP and swept along the service area. The average CSI over all the scatterers
from each cluster allows the AP to estimate the response of the environment
E(θ) with respect to the directions θ it scanned.
We consider the presence of an eavesdropper in the simulation environ-
ment who stays completely transparent to the AP. We will estimate the
average power received by the target user and the eavesdropper over several
positions of the clusters in the room. Then, we will process a power control
to guarantee the target user with receiving the same amount of power during
his whole communication. This should make the power received by the eaves-
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dropper more erratic. The results of these cases will be compared with a ﬁxed
beam applied to the AP to conclude about the eﬃciency, conﬁdentiality and
integrity of data guaranteed by the beam hopping technique to a target user.







Our system is described in Figure 2.1. The goal of the AP is to maintain
a stable link to the target user, as we don't know anything about the eaves-
dropper. This can be done assuming that the downlink CSI is equal to the
uplink CSI, i.e. an open loop system is applied because of very few changes in
the space location of the target user and consequently in the channel impulse
response which can be averaged. The AP is constituted by a single input
antenna. It will be able to generate a beam and sweep it along the service
area of dimensions (D1, D2). The randomly located target user is composed
of only one antenna for low hardware complexity and cost. This target user
is associated with several randomly located uniformly distributed clusters in
the service area with an angle θcluster from the AP, and a radius of 1m. We
assume that this assumption of the radius ﬁts to diﬀerent things we can ﬁnd
in an indoor environment, as for example a bookcase, a table or a bed. Sev-
eral scatterers are randomly located on these circular clusters in the service
area to establish multipath and are uniformly distributed. All the scatterers
have the same amplitude but their phase are diﬀerent with uniform distri-
bution, assuming uncorrelated scattering which means incoherent voltage
summation, i.e. non coherent power summation. Finally the eavesdropper is
also randomly located in the service area, composed of a single antenna and
associated with its own randomly located uniformly distributed clusters of
scatterers. Its goal is to intercept the signal sent by the AP to the target user.
Our system can be considered as a SISO system, because we have a single
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Figure 2.1: System layout
antenna at both transmitter (the AP) and receiver sides (the target user and
the eavesdropper).
For a general SISO system, the transmitted signal is:
y(t) = hk(t)⊗ x(t) (2.1)
where y(t) denotes the output of the AP's antenna, hk(t) is the average
channel impulse response relative to the AP's antenna and the cluster k.
x(t) is the signal sent by AP.
2.1.2 Antenna system
One important aspect of our project is the characterization of the beam.
Therefore, the sort of pattern we will create is not important, we can con-
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sider a pattern with only one beam. Indeed, we will consider this kind of
pattern for simplicity in our scenarios. What we need to consider here is the
HPBW, i.e. the angle covered by the pattern of the AP and associated to
the halved power transmitted.In our scenarios, we will vary the width of the
beams to see the inﬂuence on the power received by both target user and
eavesdropper.
As we only need to deal with directional responses, we will use a simple di-
rectional antenna with a directional pattern. Moreover, a mechanical system
will allow us to steer the pattern in the chosen direction.
2.1.3 Channel
Before going into the channel model, we will explain how the signal can be
modiﬁed when it is sent from the transmitter to the receiver. Three kinds of
mechanism can perturb a signal: reﬂections from large object, diﬀractions
of electromagnetic waves, and signal scattering:
 We can observe reﬂections when a wave impinges on a smooth surface
with very large dimensions compared to the Radio Frequency signal
wavelength.
 We can observe diﬀraction when the path between transmitter and
receiver is obstructed by a dense body with large dimensions compared
to the wavelength.
 Finally, we can observe scattering when a wave impinges on either a
large rough surface or any surface whose dimension are on the order of
the wavelength.
All these perturbations of signal lead to a phenomenon called multipath
eﬀect. The receiver will receive the signal from two or more paths. In our
project, we have to take into account this multipath phenomenon because
for example, we can consider this transmission will be between a base station
and a mobile phone, and all these eﬀects (diﬀraction, reﬂection, scattering)
happen to occur in the far-ﬁeld of an indoor environment. To respect the
far-ﬁeld consideration, the distance d between the AP and a cluster must
respect the following condition:
d ≥ 2∗D2λ (2.2)
where D is the size of the AP's antenna and λ is the wavelength. If we
set λ = 12.5cm (i.e. fc = 2.4GHz) and D = 20cm , d ≥ 0.64cm which
is really small compared to the dimensions of the indoor environment and
always respected. This is why the center of the clusters should be located
not closer to the AP than 1.64m for clusters with 2 meters diameter.
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We will consider an indoor service area of dimensions (D1  λ,D2  λ),
e.g. an amphitheater, and an average CSI, because of open loop SISO sys-
tem. The target user's small movements imply fading channel manifesta-
tions called "small-scale fading". Indeed, motion causes doppler shift in the
received signal components. To build our channel model, we can use the
Rayleigh fading channel model. Rayleigh fading is a model used when there
are many objects in the environment which scatter the radio signal before it
arrives at the receiver. Rayleigh fading is most applicable when there is no
dominant propagation along a line of sight between transmitter and receiver.
This model assumes that the magnitude of a signal will vary randomly, or
fade, according to a Rayleigh distribution. We consider narrowband case for
simplicity.
2.1.4 Power consideration
We will use a power modelling to model the quality of signal received by
the target user. What the target user receives fully depends on what the
cluster gets. As the AP only broadcasts towards what he can see, i.e. the
clusters, the power received by a cluster from the AP will represent the power
received by the target user with respect to our previous small-scale fading
assumption. It means that we do not need to consider the signal from the
scatterer to the target user, we just take into account the signal from the
AP to the diﬀerent scatterers.
The instantaneous and average CSI are calculated as following:








where hi,k is the instantaneous channel impulse response from AP rela-
tive to the scatterer i in cluster k, A is the amplitude of the scatterer and
φi,k represents the phase of the scaterrer i in cluster k. L1i,k is the distance
from AP to the the scatterer i in cluster k, λ is the wavelength. Nscatt is the
number of scatterers in one cluster (Nscatt = 20 in our case), and hk is the
average impulse response from AP to cluster k.
Knowing the average CSI allows us to calculate the average power re-
ceived by AP from each target user's clusters (uplink communication)








where Pri,k is the received power at AP's antenna from the scatterer i
in cluster k, PtTU is the normalized power sent by the target user and hi,k
is the instantaneous channel impulse response (see equation (2.3)). Nscatt is
the number of scatterers in one cluster (Nscatt = 20 in our case) and Prk is
the average power received by AP from cluster k.
To obtain the average power received at a cluster, we compute the Friis
transmission equation in far-ﬁeld which is:






where Pt is the transmitted power by the AP's antenna set to 20dBm,
GAP (θclusterk) is the antenna gain of the AP towards cluster k, λ is the
wavelength, L1i, k is the distance between AP and the scatterer i in the
target user's cluster k.
As our system is considered as an open loop, we assume that the down-
link(from AP to target user) is the same as the uplink because of a small
change in the space location of the target user. So if we look at Figure 2.2,
we can see what happens during an uplink communication when a scatterer
aﬀects the average channel impulse response with its proper amplitude A
and phase phi with respect to distances L1 and L2.
Figure 2.2: How scattering aﬀects the average channel impulse response
Our main parameters for our channel model are:
 center frequency: fc = 2.4GHz
 service area dimensions: D1 = 30m,D2 = 30m
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 number of target user: nbuser = 1
 number of eavesdropper: nbeaves = 1
 radius of cluster: 1m
 transmitted power by the AP's antenna: Pt = 20dBm
 noise ﬂoor: N = −80dBm
 number of clusters according to ref. [23], [24]
 Scenario 1
* number of target user's clusters: nbusercluster = 5
* number of eavesdropper's clusters: nbeavescluster = 3
 Scenario 2
* number of target user's clusters: nbusercluster = 4
* number of eavesdropper's clusters: nbeavescluster = 4
 Scenario 3
* number of target user's clusters: nbusercluster = 3
* number of eavesdropper's clusters: nbeavescluster = 5
 number of scatterers per cluster: nbscatt = 20
2.2 Algorithm
The system performance can be divided in two types as referred in [25].
 The Acquisition Phase is the state when the array is sweeping his
pattern (or beam) along the environment. At the beginning, the AP
creates a beam in a direction and gets the directional channel response
from the clusters. Then it sweeps this beam to another direction and
gets another directional channel response from the clusters as shown in
Figure 2.3. In this Figure, any eavesdropper is represented as we don't
have any directional response from him. When all the directions have
been explored, the AP obtains the directional power proﬁle (Figure
2.4) of the service area and goes to the Operation Phase. The sweeping
measurement response is calculated as following:
M(θ) =
∮
θ E(θ).A(θ − θcluster)dθ (2.8)
As we assume uncorrelated scattering, which means incoherent power
summation, the equation ( 2.8) reduces to:
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M(θ) = E(θ)⊗A(θ − θcluster) (2.9)
Figure 2.3: Aquisition phase
 The Operation Phase (after the Acquisition Phase) is a state where
the array chooses the direction corresponding to the best directional
channel response (consequently the highest power) to sweep his beam
and send his signal (Figure 2.5). Finally, to guarantee the target user
a good quality of signal throughout the sweeping process which means
a constant power received, we apply to the array a power control algo-
rithm. This power control is making sure that the target user always
receives the same amount of power by sending an appropriate amount
of power in the direction of a given cluster. This process would avoid
the eavesdropper to receive a decent and constant power and so to lis-
ten to the target user's communication.
We can remark in our algorithm that for each position of the clusters,
we are sweeping the pattern along the whole environment to get the
directional responses which will be used to jump from a cluster to
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Figure 2.4: Directional power proﬁle
Figure 2.5: Operation phase
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another to send the desired signal to the target user. It consists of our
beam sweeping/hopping algorithm.
The implementation parameters of the Matlab code are given in the





The service area is deﬁned thanks to the AP, which is set up at the
origin of the axes as shown in Figure 2.1. The service area will not
exceed 30m*30m, as we consider an indoor environement such as an
amphitheater. The AP is constituted by a single antenna.
The target user is randomly located in the deﬁned service area, and his
circular clusters are constituted by 20 scatterers located on the circle.
The radius of the circle is set to 1m and changed to 1.5m for compar-
ison. The scatterers are randomly uniformly distibuted on the circle.
The amplitude of each scatterer is 1dB but their phase is randomly
chosen.
The eavesdropper is also randomly located in the deﬁned service area,
and his circular clusters are constitued by 20 scatterers located on a
circle. However, we don't know anything about the eavesdropper, like
his position or his power as he is not emmiting any signal. The eaves-
dropper is only listening and trying to intercept any other signals.
A Rayleigh fading environment is assumed and the angular spread is
set to 0°. To represent the Rayleigh distribution we will consider 20
waves (because of the 20 scatteres) arriving at the AP (knowing that
a minimum of 8 waves are necessary to represent a Rayleigh distribu-
tion) [26]. The amplitude of each of these waves is the same while a
random phase is generated for each of them.
As a reminder, the average power received at a cluster is calculated as
following:
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where Pt is the transmitted power of the AP set to 20dBm in our
simulations, GAP (θclusterk) is the gain of the AP set to either 5dBi,
8dBi, 9dBi, or 10dBi depending on the beamwidth of its beam pattern.
L1i, k is the distance between the AP and the cluster concerned. The
gain of the cluster is set to 1 or 0dBi so this is why it does not appear
in the equation.
In our project, we evaluate and compare the power received by the
target user and the power received by the eavesdropper when the AP
is equipped with a mechanically sweeping antenna. All the results will
be shown in the next chapter.
3.2 Parameters deﬁnition and scenarios
The noise ﬂoor in our simulations is set to−80dBm which seems to be a
realistic threshold for an indoor service area as shown in [27] and [28].
The SER is a parameter we will use to check when the amount of
power received by the target user is superior to the power received by
the eavesdropper. This parameter is given by the relationship:
SER = SE (3.2)
where S is the power received by the target user, E is the power re-
ceived by the eavesdropper. We will plot the CDF of the SER.
The SNR is an absolute parameter we will check to evaluate the eﬃ-
ciency of our results as the SER is just a relative value. This parameter
is given by the relationship:
SNR = SN (3.3)
where S is the power received by the target user or eavesdropper, N
is the noise ﬂoor in the service area set to −80dBm. We will plot the
CDF of the SNR.
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The power received by the target user Puser (resp. eavesdropper Peaves)
is a parameter used to evaluate the amount of power received after one
simulation, knowing that we consider 200 diﬀerent positions of both
target user and eavesdropper's clusters in one simulation. We will plot
this curve and check how often the power of the eavesdropper is higher
thant the target user's one. Then we will make an average of this power
over 10 simulations. One point of this curve will represent an average
of the power received by the target user Puser (resp. eavesdropper
Peaves) over 200 positions of clusters. Afterwards, we will make the
same simulations using a power control, which will allow us to adjust
the power sent by the AP so that each cluster receives the same amount
of power. All these results will be compared with a reference, which is
a non hopping antenna.
To do that we will consider 3 scenarios:
 Fixed beam: This ﬁrst scenario will be the reference, what will allow
us to see if the solution we propose will perturbate the signal received
by the eavesdroper.
 Beam hopping: In this scenario, we will use a beam hopping system
to send the signal to the target user. The algorithm described below
will allow us to jump between clusters to send this signal to the one
receiving the highest power.
 Beam hopping + AGC: We will add to the previous scenario a power
control, which makes the power of the signal received by the target
user always constant.
3.3 Procedure
Let us describe the procedure we will follow to plot the results of our
simulations. This procedure is divided in two steps:
 acquisition phase
 operation phase
We will repeat these two steps each time we will repeat our algorithm.
3.3.1 Acquisition phase
 for each position of the clusters
 sweep the service area
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 ﬁnd the directional responses of the clusters of the target user
 estimating the average CSI from each cluster of the target user to
AP (see equation (2.3))
 adapt the beam towards the cluster, which presents the best CSI
3.3.2 Sending of the information
 for each position of the clusters
 computing the power received by the AP from each cluster (see
equation (2.6))
 computing the gain towards the cluster with the best CSI
 estimating the received power at this chosen cluster of the target
user (see equation (3.1))
 adapting the power so that each cluster receives the same amount
of power (Power control)
 estimating the received power at each cluster of the target user
and eavesdropper (see equation (3.1))




This chapter is dedicated to the results of our Matlab simulation. We
are going to present all the results of the diﬀerent scenarios. The results
will be presented for each scenario regarding the number of clusters for
both target user and eavesdropper, the radius of these clusters and the
beamwidth of the main beam in the radiation pattern of the AP. Table
4.1 below, is a brief reminder of the diﬀerent parameters we changed
during the simulations of all the scenarios.
Simulation parameters
Scenario 1: Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Reference
Power management Fixed Beam Beam Hopping Beam Hopping +
AGC
Number of positions of the 200 200 200
clusters in 1 simulation
Number of simulations 10 10 10
Table 4.1: Simulations parameters table
The AGC power management consists of guaranteeing the target user
with a constant amount of power received, i.e. a dynamic power al-
location at AP before transmitting its signal. The number of posi-
tions of the clusters per simulation is set to 200 for both target user
and eavesdropper's clusters which means that these clusters will be
moved 200 times to uniformly distributed random locations in the ser-
vice area during 1 simulation. The number of simulations represents
how many times both target user and eavesdropper are moved to uni-
formly distributed random locations in the service area. As we con-
sider 10 simulations, this means that the clusters will change positions
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200 ∗ 10 = 2000 times over all the simulations.
Below is a Table 4.2 summarizing the parameters related to both
target user and eavesdropper's clusters .
Clusters parameters
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Number of scatterers per cluster 20 20 20
Number of target user's clusters 4 5/4/3 5/4/3
Number of eavesdropper's clusters 4 3/4/5 3/4/5
Radius of clusters [m] 1 1 1
Table 4.2: Clusters parameters table
For scenario 2 and scenario 3 the results will be divided in three parts:
 when the target user is associated with more clusters than the
eavesdropper
 when the target user and eavesdropper are associated with the
same number of clusters
 when the target user is associated with less clusters than the
eavesdropper
Inside each of these parts we will focus on three representative ﬁgures.
The ﬁrst interesting plot to check is the average power received by both
target user and eavesdropper for each movement of the clusters within
one simulation. This tells us about the eﬃciency of the antenna pat-
tern. Then we focus on the average power received by both target user
and eavesdropper for every movement of the clusters over all the sim-
ulations which allows us to have a more general view of the amount of
power received over a huge number of locations considerations. Then
we look at the CDF of SER to check how often the target user has
a better signal than the eavesdropper. Obviously, the more often the
target user has a better signal, the more eﬃcient is the antenna pattern
management. Finally, we observe the SNR for both target user and
eavesdropper to see if the eavesdropper's clusters are located close to
the target user's ones.
Afterwards, we will focus on the eﬀects of the radius and the beamwidth
of the antenna pattern on the power received by both target user and
eavesdropper's clusters.
Below are two Table 4.3 (resp.Table 4.4) summarizing the parameters
related to both target user and eavesdropper's radius (resp. beamwidth).
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Radius parameters
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Number of scatterers per cluster 20 20 20
Number of target user's clusters 4 4 4
Number of eavesdropper's clusters 4 4 4
Radius of clusters [m] 1/1.5 1/1.5 1/1.5
Table 4.3: Radius parameters table
Beamwidth parameters
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Number of scatterers per cluster 20 20 20
Number of target user's clusters 4 4 4
Number of eavesdropper's clusters 4 4 4
Beamwidth [°] 60° 10°/25°/60° 10°/25°/60°
Table 4.4: Beamwidth parameters table
The last part of this chapter will compare the results obtained with a
reference.
Figure 4.1 below represents the response of the environment. We take
into account this information in every scenario to be able to choose
the direction of the pattern. We observe that the best received power
from the environment comes from the direction 100-120° on this ﬁgure
so the AP will mechanically hop its beam towards this direction. This
ﬁgure is quite ﬂat because in this case, the target user's clusters are
quite close to each other, which leads to a smooth response of the en-
vironment.
Figure 4.1: Environment response
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4.1 Inﬂuence of the number of clusters
4.1.1 First scenario : Fixed beam
This ﬁrst scenario will be used as a reference for the next scenarios.
Indeed, we will consider a ﬁxed beam pattern, which will be used to
send the information towards the target user and the eavesdropper. In
this simulation, we consider 4 clusters for both target user and eaves-
dropper. The radius of the cluster is set to 1m. The signal will be
sent in a random direction and we will estimate the power received by
both target user and eavesdropper, using two diﬀerent orientations of
the beam: 0° and 90°.
Beam pattern
Figure 4.2 represents one of the two ﬁxed patterns used in this scenario,
this one being oriented at 90°. We will compare the results obtained
using a pattern oriented in the 90° direction and a pattern oriented in
the 0° direction. Their half-power beamwidth is of 60° for an antenna
gain of 5dBi. Making a comparison of the results we will obtain with
this two ﬁxed beams is interesting because we should theoritically ob-
tain the same SER for the two orientations of the beam as the clusters
for both target user and eavesdropper are randomly uniformly located.
Average power received
Figure 4.3 (resp. Figure 4.4) represents the average power received
by both target user (full line with stars) and eavesdropper (dotted line
with diamonds) considering a beam with an orientation of 0° (resp.
90°). The shape and value obtained are similar on both ﬁgures. The
orientation of the beam doesn't inﬂuence the results, because we are
considering the same number of clusters for both target user and eaves-
dropper and all the clusters are randomnly located. So the closer to
the AP one cluster is, the higher power he receives during the simula-
tion. It is relevant that the received power is slightly higher (around
1dB better) with a beam oriented at 90° since the maximum values of
the gain can be reached on both sides of the beam whereas it can only
happen on the left side of the beam for a 0° oriented beam (the service
area is 180° wide from the AP's point of view).
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6) showing the power received for each new
position of the clusters lead to the same observation with a minimum
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Figure 4.2: Fixed beam oriented in the 90° direction
value of received power by the target user of −79dBm for a 90° ori-
ented beam and −89dBm for a 0° oriented beam which exceeds the
noise ﬂoor and is not usedul to the target user. The same diﬀerence is
observable for the minimum power received by the eavesdropper.
SER
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 represent the CDF of the SER with an
orientation of the beam of 0° and 90°. The results are in compliance
with what we expected. Indeed, the power received by the target
user is equal or higher than the power received by the eavesdropper
on both curves 50% of the time. This is because all the clusters are
randomnly located, so we have equal chances to have a cluster of a
target user (resp.eavesdropper) closer than a cluster of an eavesdropper
(resp.target user) to the AP. These results will be considered as a
reference for the others scenarios.
SNR
In Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 are shown the CDF of the SNR for
both orientations of the beam. The target user and the eavesdropper
present almost the same curves still because of the randomness of their
clusters location. Their maximum SNR is of 60dB for both of them.
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Figure 4.3: Average power received by the target user and the eavesdropper
after 10 simulations (0°)
Figure 4.4: Average power received by the target user and the eavesdropper
after 10 simulations (90°)
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Figure 4.5: Power received by the target user and the eavesdropper after 1
simulation (0°)
They should support the same modulation rate and it would be possi-
ble for the eavesdropper to decode the target user's signal.
4.1.2 Second scenario : Beam-Hopping
In this scenario, we apply a beam-hopping technique to the AP's pat-
tern so it can sweep its beam along the environment to get its response
and choose one of the target user's cluster to 'jump' its beam towards.
The target user is associated with more clusters than the
eavesdropper
In this case, we considered 5 clusters for the target user and 3 clusters
for the eavesdropper.
In Figure 4.11, we can see that the power received by the target
user (full line with stars) is most of the time better than what the
eavesdropper receives (dotted line with diamonds) due to more clusters
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Figure 4.6: Power received by the target user and the eavesdropper after 1
simulation (90°)
located in the service area giving less chances to the eavesdropper to
catch the signal sent by the AP towards one of the target user's cluster.
Then, the plotted CDF in Figure 4.12 shows that the eavesdropper
receives a higher power from the AP than the target user in less than
18% of the cases. In other terms, the target user has a better quality
of signal in 82% of the simulations with a bigger number of clusters
associated with him. As another reference, the target user reaches a
30 dB higher power than the eavesdropper in 10% of the simulations.
In Figure 4.13, it is obvious that the SNR (steeper curve on the right)
of the target user is very good and steep (i.e. stable signal) compared
to the eavesdropper (curve on the left) and always above 40dB. How-
ever for the eavesdropper this ratio happens to be negative in a few
cases, i.e. the eavesdropper is unable to catch any exploitable signal
and its curve is really ﬂat compared to the target user's one meaning
that its signal is erratic. Besides, in 20% of the cases considered, the
diﬀerence between the 2 ratios is bigger than 18dB which is quite in-
teresting if we consider a suitable modulation rate for the target user's
signal.
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Figure 4.7: CDF of the SER (0°)[dB]
The target user and eavesdropper are associated with the
same number of clusters
In this case, we considered 4 clusters for the target user and 4 clusters
for the eavesdropper.
In Figure 4.14, we can see that the power received by the target user
(full line with stars) is most of the time better than what the eaves-
dropper receives (dotted line with diamonds) due to to the orientation
of the beam in the direction of the target user. However, the curve of
the power received by the eavesdropper is more often over the target
user one than on the Figure 4.11, because we are considering one clus-
ter less for the target user and one cluster more for the eavesdropper
than the previous case (5 clusters for the target user and 3 for the
eavesdropper). Meanwhile, the eavesdropper still presents low power
levels down to −85dBm, i.e. below the noise ﬂoor.
The CDF in Figure 4.15 shows that the eavesdropper receives a higher
power from the AP than the target user 27% of the time. In other
terms, the target user has a better quality of signal in 73% of the
simulations with the same number of clusters associated with him. As
an other reference, the target user reaches a 20 dB higher power than
the eavesdropper in 16% of the simulations.
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Figure 4.8: CDF of the SER (90°)[dB]
In Figure 4.16 the diﬀerence between the two curves in 20% of the
simulations is of approximately 14dB. This variation leads to a quite
good SER on Figure 4.15 as the target user's clusters are obviously
closer to the AP. Besides the eavesdropper's curve is very ﬂat and
makes its signal unstable with poor SNR (lower than 0dB) in almost
5% of the cases. The target user's curve is steep, sign of stability, and
always above 40dB, guaranteeing him with a good and stable signal.
The target user is associated with less clusters than the eaves-
dropper
In this case, we consider 3 clusters for the target user and 5 clusters
for the eavesdropper.
In Figure 4.17, we can see that the power received by the target user
(full line with stars) is almost two thirds of the time better than what
the eavesdropper receives (dotted line with diamonds) due to direc-
tional pattern towards one of his cluster but since the eavesdropper
has more clusters associated, it still has good chances to catch the sig-
nal sent by the AP towards one of the target user's cluster. Whereas
the power levels for the eavesdropper happen to be really low and down
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Figure 4.9: CDF of the SNR (0°)[dB]
to the noise ﬂoor sometimes.
The CDF in Figure 4.18 shows that the eavesdropper receives a higher
power from the AP than the target user in 40% of the cases. In other
terms, the target user has a better quality of signal in 60% of the
simulations with a smaller number of clusters associated with him. As
an other reference, the target user reaches a 20 dB higher power than
the eavesdropper in 12% of the simulations.
In Figure 4.19, the target user has a better SNR (steeper curve on
the right) than the eavesdropper (curve on the left) but the diﬀerence
is not that big since in 20% of the simulations the target user's SNR
is only 6dB higher than the eavesdropper's one. Of course, the tar-
get user's curve is always above 40dB and the eavesdropper's curve is
quite ﬂat but these two curves tend to equalize around 20% of the time
also. This is quite bad for the target user who can have is transmission
decoded quite often in this case.
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Figure 4.10: CDF of the SNR (90°)[dB]
Figure 4.11: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(5cl vs 3cl)
Conclusion for the second scenario
Considering more clusters associated with the target user than with
the eavesdropper leads to the best results in terms of power received
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Figure 4.12: CDF of the SER [dB] (5cl vs 3cl)
Figure 4.13: CDF of the SNR [dB] (5cl vs 3cl)
over each simulation, in terms of SER and also SNR.
Besides, considering the same number of clusters for both target user
and eavesdropper or less clusters for the target user still shows that
the latter receives a higher power in both cases. It is clear that adding
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Figure 4.14: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(4cl vs 4cl)
Figure 4.15: CDF of the SER [dB] (4cl vs 4cl)
more and more clusters for the eavesdropper would make the SER
tend to 0dB in 50% of the simulations and the SNR of the eavesdrop-
per approaching the target user's one more and more often, but this
necessitates a huge number of clusters for the eavesdropper compared
to the target user and has not been reached in our simulations yet.
Obviously, the Beam-Hopping technique deteriorates the SNR of the
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Figure 4.16: CDF of the SNR [dB] (4cl vs 4cl)
Figure 4.17: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(3cl vs 5cl)
eavesdropper while improving the one of the target user, and at the
same time provides better results than when a ﬁxed beam is applied
at the AP.
The two main points of the second scenario are:
 Optimizing the pattern in the direction of the target user's clus-
ters
 Checking if the directional pattern makes it more diﬃcult for the
eavesdropper to catch a stable signal
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Figure 4.18: CDF of the SER [dB] (3cl vs 5cl)
Figure 4.19: CDF of the SNR [dB] (3cl vs 5cl)
4.1.3 Third scenario : Beam-Hopping + AGC
Besides the fact that the AP is still jumping its beam towards one
of the target user's cluster, it is also applied a process called AGC
that can guarantee the target user with receiving the same amount of
power for any position of his clusters. Indeed the AP will adapt his
power transmitted so that the target user will always receive a power
42
of −25dBm.
The target user is associated with more clusters than the
eavesdropper
In this case, the target user is associated with 5 clusters while the
eavesdropper is associated with 3.
The average received power level after AGC is set to −25dBm for the
target user in Figure 4.20. We can see that variance of the eaves-
dropper's power is really big with a maximum value of −12dBm and
a minimum of −88dBm which is happening due to the fact that his
clusters are located at the edge of the service area with great angles
between them and the target user's clusters with respect to the AP.
It can happen that the eavesdropper receives more than −25dBm when
the target user is very far from the AP and the eavesdropper is very
close to it with an angle approaching the direction of the target user.
In this case, the AP will send a lot of power so that the target user
receive −25dBm. As a consequence, the eavesdropper will receive a
higher power than −25dBm.
Figure 4.20: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(5cl vs 3cl)
Concerning the CDF of the SER, we can see in Figure 4.21 that the
eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target user
in less than 18% of the cases. In other terms, the target user has a
better quality of signal in 82% of the simulations with a bigger number
of clusters associated with him. As an other reference, the target user
reaches a 30 dB higher power than the eavesdropper in 18% of the
simulations. This is reﬂected in Figure 4.22 where the SNR of the
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target user is always 55dB due to the noise ﬂoor set at −80dBm. In
20% of the cases, the diﬀerence between the power received by the
target user and the one receive by the eavesdropper is 20dB. The
target user's clusters receive a lot more power than the eavesdropper's
thanks to AGC and the orientation of the beam.
Figure 4.21: CDF of the SER [dB] (5cl vs 3cl)
The target user and eavesdropper are associated with the
same number of clusters
In this case, the target user is associated with 4 clusters and the eaves-
dropper is associated with 4 clusters as well.
The average received power level after AGC is set to −25dBm for the
target user in Figure 4.23. We can see that variance of the eaves-
dropper's power is still big with a maximum value of −9dBm and
a minimum of −77dBm which is happening due to the fact that his
clusters are located at the edge of the service area with great angles
between them and the target user's clusters with respect to the AP as
said previously.
Concerning the CDF of the SER, we can see in Figure 4.24 that the
eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target user
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Figure 4.22: CDF of the SNR [dB] (5cl vs 3cl)
Figure 4.23: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(4cl vs 4cl)
in less than 27% of the cases. In other terms, the target user has a
better quality of signal in 73% of the simulations. As an other reference,
the target user reaches a 20 dB higher power than the eavesdropper in
15% of the simulations. These quite good results are conﬁrmed by the
SNR plot in Figure 4.25 which shows us that the eavesdropper has
30% of the chances to get a SNR smaller than 40dB while the target
user has always a 55dB SNR. Finally, the diﬀerence between the power
received by the target user and the one received by the eavesdropper
is 17dB in 20% of the cases.
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Figure 4.24: CDF of the SER [dB] (4cl vs 4cl)
Figure 4.25: CDF of the SNR [dB] (4cl vs 4cl)
The target user is associated with less clusters than the eaves-
dropper
In this case, the target user is associated with 3 clusters while the
eavesdropper is associated with 5.
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The average received power level after AGC is set to −25dBm for
the target user in Figure 4.26. The eavesdropper receives a better
power for much more positions than previously because of his good
chances over the target user to catch the signal from the AP with 2
more clusters randomly located in the service area. We can see that
the variance of the eavesdropper's power is still big with a maximum
value of −10dBm and a minimum of −89dBm.
Figure 4.26: Power received by both TU and Eavesdropper over 1 simulation
(3cl vs 5cl)
Concerning the CDF of the SER, we can see in Figure 4.27 that that
the eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target
user in less than 40% of the cases. In other terms, the target user has a
better quality of signal in 60% of the simulations. As an other reference,
the target user reaches a 10 dB higher power than the eavesdropper
in 23% of the simulations. The results are conﬁrmed in Figure 4.28
where the SNR of the eavesdropper is better than the target user's one
in 40% of the cases. Finally, the diﬀerence between the power received
by the target user and the one received by the eavesdropper is 12dB
in 20% of the cases.
Conclusion for the third scenario
The Beam Hopping pattern combined with an AGC process lead to a
constant power level delivered to the target user while the eavesdropper
receives an erratic signal oscillating in a big range of values all the
time. Of course these observations are emphasized when the target
user beneﬁts from a bigger number of clusters. Besides, the CDF of
the SER in both cases are really steep which attests the eﬃciency
of the AGC process making eavesdropping more diﬃcult. The same
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Figure 4.27: CDF of the SER [dB] (3cl vs 5cl)
Figure 4.28: CDF of the SNR [dB] (3cl vs 5cl)
observation can be made on the SNR of the target user. The two main
points of the third scenario are:
 Applying an AGC process to the optimized directional beam pat-
tern.
 Checking if the AGC combined with the directional pattern makes
it more diﬃcult for the eavesdropper to catch a stable signal while
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always guaranteeing the target user with a constant amount of
power.
4.1.4 Comparison
These simulations oﬀered two techniques to perturb the signal received
by the eavesdrooper.
The ﬁrst part showed that the use of a mechanical hopping antenna
brings a big improvement in the perturbation of the signal received by
the eavesdropper. Indeed, the chances that the average power received
by the eavesdropper would be equal or higher that the one received by
the target user decrease from 50% to 27% (Figure 4.29) when using
Beam-Hopping. It allows us to say that it is more diﬃcult for the
eavesdropper to catch the signal sent by the AP.
Figure 4.29: SER comparison between the reference ﬁxed beam (left) and
the hopping antenna system without AGC (right) (4cl vs 4cl) [dB]
Finally, the Figure 4.30 displays the results of the three scenarios
regarding the SNR. Adding the AGC to the beam hopping pattern
system makes the life more diﬃcult for the eavesdropper, which means
that it will be very hard for him to catch the signal. Moreover, if a
target user's cluster is very close to the AP and the eavesdropper's one
farther, the power sent by the AP would be very weak. As a conse-
quence, the power received by the eavesdropper's cluster will be even
weaker than without AGC.
4.2 Inﬂuence of the radius of clusters
This section is dedicated to the inﬂuence of the radius of the clusters
on the power received by both target user and eavesdropper's clusters.
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Figure 4.30: SER comparison between the reference ﬁxed beam (left), the
hopping antenna system without AGC (right) and the hopping antenna sys-
tem with AGC (down) (4cl vs 4cl)[dB]
We can easily see in Figure 4.31, Figure 4.32 and Figure 4.33 that the
radius of the clusters has a weak inﬂuence on the results. Indeed, we
can see in Figure 4.31 that the eavesdropper receives a higher power
from the AP than the target user does in less than 20% of the cases,
because the beam is wide enough to reach all the scatterers on a clus-
ter when the radius is either 1m or 1.5m. This is conﬁrmed on Figure
4.32 and Figure 4.33 where the diﬀerence between the power received
by the target user and the one received by the eavesdropper is always
the same.
4.3 Inﬂuence of the beamwidth
Figure 4.34 represents the pattern created with diﬀerent values of the
HPBW. In this part, we use the same number of clusters for both
target user and eavesdropper. The radius is also the same and set to
1m. The wider the beam will be, the lower the maximum gain will be.
Figure 4.35 shows the CDF of the SNR using diﬀerent values of
HPBW. As a reminder, the eavesdropper had less than 50% of chances
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Figure 4.31: CDF of the SER [dB]: Inﬂuence of radius (4cl vs 4cl)
Figure 4.32: CDF of the SNR [dB] comparison between the radius in scenario
2 (4cl vs 4cl)
Figure 4.33: CDF of the SNR [dB] comparison between the radius in scenario
3 (4cl vs 4cl)
to have a power received equal or lower than the power received by the
target user.
The results using a HPBW=10° (top left) are the best ones, as the
eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target user
does in less than 19% of the cases. Using a a HPBW=25° (top left),
the eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target
user in less than 24% of the cases.Using a a HPBW=60° (top left),
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Figure 4.34: 3 diﬀerent patterns [dB]
the eavesdropper receives a higher power from the AP than the target
user in less than 27.% of the cases. Indeed, the narrower the beam is,
the higher the gain will be for the target user. As a consequence, the
power received by the target user will be higher. Morever, the beam is
wide enough to reach all the scattererd on the cluster.
4.4 Conclusion
To conclude on this simulation, it is obvious to say that combining
a beam-hopping pattern technique with a AGC is already quite ro-
bust against eavesdroppers. Indeed, the results in this case are better
than the reference and also than the case when we only use the beam-
hopping pattern. Therefore, it can happen that the eavesdropper stays
a certain period with receiving a very good average power. This lets us
suppose that he would be able to catch some information during this
period.
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Figure 4.35: CDF of the SER with a HPBW of 10° (top left), 25° (top right)
and 60° (down) [dB]
Figure 4.36: CDF of the SNR with a HPBW of 10° (top left), 25° (top right)
and 60° (down)(scenario 3)
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One interesting technique which would have been interesting to test
is the use of a threshold applied to the environmental power proﬁle
which would have allowed us to send the signal towards more than one
cluster at the same time.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
5.1 Conclusion
This project presents one aspect of the security in a transmission be-
tween a target user and an AP. What is the key topic in wireless
communications is how to guarantee the target user with conﬁdential-
ity and integrity of his data. In this purpose, we investigated a way
to optimize the security level at the physical layer so that conﬁden-
tiality is delivered to the target user in a transparent way. To do so,
our project is based on Beam-Hopping techniques applied to the AP
radiation pattern. These techniques were investigated to check if an
eavesdropper would be able to catch a stable signal in a multipath in-
door environment, assuming that the AP would broadcast its signal in
optimized directions for the target user. The other goal was to achieve
a certain trade-oﬀ between security/privacy and hardware complexity
so that the solution could be realizable and reach the market.
1. First chapter.
First of all, we had to restrict our problem to a certain domain
of work (space domain), a certain type of system (SISO) and to
narrow down to a problem that has not been dealt with yet by
searching for previous works on the subject.
2. Second chapter.
In this chapter, we focused on describing the technical process-
ings that we would like to apply to our system and especially to
the AP. An entire description of the antenna system (mechanical
steering pattern), the channel (average CSI, open-loop, far-ﬁeld
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and Rayleigh fading considerations), the power modelling (power
summation because of non-coherent scattered responses) and the
beam-hopping algorithm is made.
3. Third chapter.
This third step is used to describe the simulation environment
and the several scenarios we plan to investigate in this environ-
ment.
4. Fourth and last chapter.
This last chapter displays the results obtained from the diﬀerent
Matlab simulations we ran.
Our simulations are divided into thre main parts. The ﬁrst part ana-
lyzes the inﬂuence of the number of clusters associated with the target
user and the eavesdropper on the SER considering a ﬁxed beam (stan-
dard) AP, a beam-hopping AP and another beam-hopping AP with a
gain control algorithm applied to it.
The second part observes the same SER parameter and the average
power received by both target user and eavesdropper when diﬀerent
radius of clusters are chosen and considering the same three kinds of
scenarios as previously. Finally, the last part deals with the inﬂuence
of the beamwidth for the pattern over the same curves considering the
same kind of APs.
5.1.1 Conclusion for the ﬁrst part
 Best type of antenna system for AP.
The most eﬃcient type of antenna for the AP is the beam-
hopping system combined with an AGC that allows the target
user to get a stable signal while the eavesdropper receives an er-
ratic signal with a great variance no matter if the eavesdropper
is associated with more clusters than the target user.
 Beam-Hopping technique alone is not suﬃcient.
The Beam-Hopping technique provides results favouring the tar-
get user but the eavesdropper is still able to catch a good signal
in almost 30% of the cases which is not suﬃcient to trust the
technique applied without another algorithm to optimize it. Be-
sides, the SNR of the target user could be stabilized while the
SNR of the eavesdropper would be deteriorated.
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 Beam-Hopping technique combined with AGC improves signiﬁ-
cantly the standard AP with a ﬁxed beam pattern.
Considering uniformly distributed random locations for both tar-
get user and eavesdropper leads to equal probabilities of having
a good signal for both if the AP has its radiation pattern ﬁxed.
However, applying Beam-Hopping techniques and adding gain
control processing hugely improves the chances of the target user
to catch a stable signal and so make it more secure for his com-
munications by increasing the diﬀerence between the target user
and the eavesdropper SNR (0dB for the ﬁxed beam to 17dB in
the best case for beam hopping with AGC) .
5.1.2 Conclusion for the second part
 Best type of antenna system for AP.
The most eﬃcient type of antenna for the AP is still the beam-
hopping system combined with an AGC no matter if the eaves-
dropper's clusters have a bigger radius than the target user's
ones.
 The radius of the clusters is not a signiﬁcant parameter in the
simulations.
Considering uniformly distributed random locations for both tar-
get user and eavesdropper's clusters leads to equal probabilities
of having a good signal for both if the AP has its radiation pat-
tern ﬁxed. However, the Beam-Hopping techniques and above
all adding gain control processing hugely improves the chances
of the target user to catch a good stable signal even though the
eavesdropper's clusters are considered bigger.
5.1.3 Conclusion for the third part
 Best type of antenna system for AP.
The most eﬃcient type of antenna for the AP is still the beam-
hopping system combined with an AGC no matter if the beam
is wide or narrow.
 The beamwidth of the pattern is an important parameter.
Considering uniformly distributed random locations for both tar-
get user and eavesdropper's clusters leads to equal probabilities
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of having a good signal for both if the AP has its radiation pat-
tern ﬁxed. However, the Beam-Hopping techniques and above
all adding gain control processing hugely improves the chances
of the target user to catch a good stable signal. But in cases
of a small beamwidth, the results are better because the power
received by the target user will be higher thanks to a bigger gain
and the eavesdropper would have to be really close to the target
user to catch a decent signal.
5.2 Future work
The Beam-hopping technique (beam steering) combined with the gain
control processing have shown some interesting results in terms of sta-
bility of target user's signal and security but a few cases could be
investigated more deeply to proof the method eﬃciency such as:
1. More antenna elements at the AP.
The AP could be equipped with more antenna elements to im-
prove the precision of the beam pattern.
2. Several target users and/or several eavesdroppers.
It could be interesting to simulate the system with more users
involved to get an idea of the eﬃciency of the techniques in a real
mobile network situation with several customers to protect from
possible eavesdropping.
3. Apply a threshold to the response of the environment to be able
to send the signal toward more than one cluster.
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